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Abstract
The dissolution of the standard employment relationship since the 1970s has been par-
alleled by a destabilization of family relations. The paper, which is a slightly revised 
version of a plenary lecture at the 2008 Meeting of the German Sociological Associa-
tion, discusses possible connections between the rise of more flexible labor market and 
family structures, and explores how they might tie in with the declining birth rate. The 
co-evolution of labor markets and family relations can be explained by both the attrac-
tions and the constraints of free markets. The current shift toward a new social policy 
aimed at increasing fertility is presented as an example of how expanding market rela-
tions and the uncertainty to which they give rise in personal life cause demands for 
state intervention. The logic seems remarkably similar to that of the current banking 
crisis, where the liberation of financial markets from traditional constraints and the 
progressive commodification of money have ultimately issued in irresistible pressures 
on the state to step in and restore the social commons of stable expectations and mutual 
confidence. In both cases, and perhaps generally, capitalism seems to imply a need for 
a public power capable of creating substitutes for social relations invaded by market 
relations and as a consequence losing their capacity to perform some of their previous 
functions. 
Zusammenfassung
Parallel zum Niedergang des Normalarbeitsverhältnisses seit den Siebzigerjahren ha-
ben auch die familiären Beziehungen an institutioneller Verbindlichkeit verloren. Das 
Papier – die leicht überarbeitete Fassung eines Plenarvortrags beim 34. Deutschen So-
ziologentag im Oktober 2008 – diskutiert mögliche Zusammenhänge zwischen der Fle-
xibilisierung von Arbeitsmärkten und Familienstrukturen und setzt diese in Beziehung 
zu der gleichzeitig gesunkenen Geburtenrate. Als Ursache der Koevolution von Arbeits-
märkten und Familienbeziehungen kommen sowohl die Attraktivität freier Märkte als 
auch die von ihnen ausgehenden wirtschaftlichen Zwänge in Frage. Der gegenwärtige 
Übergang zu einer neuen, auf Hebung der Geburtenrate zielenden Sozialpolitik ist ein 
Beispiel, wie die Expansion von Marktbeziehungen und die von ihr ausgehende Unsi-
cherheit auch der persönlichen Lebensverhältnisse Forderungen nach staatlicher Inter-
vention nach sich zieht. Die Logik ist dieselbe wie in der Bankenkrise, wo die Befreiung 
der Kapitalmärkte von traditionellen Beschränkungen und die zunehmende Kommo-
difizierung des Geldes den Staat gezwungen haben, mit öffentlichen Mitteln stabile 
Erwartungen und gegenseitiges Vertrauen wiederherzustellen. In beiden Fällen, und 
wahrscheinlich generell, erzeugt Kapitalismus ein Bedürfnis nach staatlicher Ersatzbe-
schaffung für soziale Beziehungen, die als Folge ihrer Vermarktung ihre ursprünglichen 
Funktionen nicht mehr zu erfüllen vermögen.
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Flexible markets, stable societies?
How much economic uncertainty is compatible with social stability? How much social 
stability is required for economic uncertainty to be sustainable? These are no minor 
questions: they refer to the extent to which free markets must be contained, or embed-
ded, to function and be acceptable to human beings. Both markets and, in particular, 
human beings require stable social relations. Free, or “self-regulating,” markets, how-
ever, imply fluctuating relative prices. Relative prices, however, determine the life chanc-
es and the sustainability of the ways of life of those who produce or otherwise depend 
on traded commodities. This applies in particular in markets for labor. Where relative 
prices of labor are allowed to fluctuate freely, wage structures are continuously upset, 
wages may shift rapidly or disappear, skills may become unmarketable without notice, 
and individuals will be under constant pressure to adjust their lives and their concepts 
of worth and value to unpredictably changing external conditions – even though what 
they need most are societies that sustain stable identities and identifications, support 
reliable commitments and trust, and make possible long-term investments in lasting 
social bonds. This is why Polanyi saw labor as an essentially imperfect, “fictitious” com-
modity, and markets as grinding “satanic mills” destructive of the very sort of social 
relations without which, he believed, human beings were unable to live and markets 
unable to function (Polanyi 1957 [1944]).
The organized capitalism of the 1950s and 1960s was an international response to the 
social devastations that were widely perceived at the time to have been caused by the 
unfettered operation of self-regulating markets in the 1920s and 1930s. The political 
economy of Fordism or Keynesianism, terms that were used almost interchangeably, 
was deliberately designed to reconcile capitalism with social stability. It allowed for a 
newly settled way of life for the generations that had been through the Great Depres-
sion and the Second World War. At its center was a regime of social rights, generated 
by democratic politics, that was to take precedence over the mechanisms of the market: 
rights to a minimum level of income, freedom from poverty, a modicum of social and 
economic equality, equal access to education, and social security in periods of unem-
ployment, illness, and in old age. Re-establishment of a capitalist political economy 
was made conditional on capitalism allowing itself to be tailored to the needs of social 
communities, as perceived at the time. Governments remodeled their states into ma-
chineries specializing in the provision of steady employment and stable wages, capable 
supposedly of moving jobs to workers rather than vice versa, evening out the business 
cycle, securing industrial peace, safeguarding worker rights at the workplace, building 
up and running giant national infrastructures to facilitate economic progress, and start-
ing grands projets of all sorts to stimulate technological innovation. Moreover, collective 
agreements negotiated by strong unions, with complementary social security systems, 
Contribution to a Plenary Session on “Uncertain Exchanges. Innovation, Stability and the Societal 
Repercussions of Contemporary Capitalism,” Biannual Meeting of the German Sociological Associa-
tion, Jena, October 6–9, 2008.
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supported an established family structure with a gendered division of labor that was 
sustained by a family wage for a single income earner, partly allowing and partly con-
straining women to remain in the household and defend family life against the com-
modifying and rationalizing pressures of the market.
As is well known, by the 1970s, the Fordist promises of economic and social security 
and stability could no longer be kept, or in any case began to be gradually withdrawn. 
Increasingly, employers and governments urged workers and unions no longer to insist, 
in an ever more competitive world, on what now was denounced as the “rigidities” of a 
defunct old regime, and concede more “flexibility” – in employment and deployment, 
skill structures, wages and wage structures, working time, and just about every other as-
pect of the employment relationship. Rather than continue to demand security, work-
ers were asked to take more risks and accept more responsibility, sharing in the risks and 
responsibilities of employers struggling hard to defend their “competitiveness” in in-
creasingly global markets. Step by step, the standard employment relationship, as it had 
come to be called, of the Fordist era was being dismantled. The process has taken time, 
extending over more than two decades, and is still under way. Moreover, it progressed 
and progresses along different trajectories in different countries, although in its core it 
is the same everywhere in that it makes workers respond faster to market changes; bear 
a growing share of the costs of structural adjustment; accept more regional, occupa-
tional and in particular downward mobility, as imposed by more stringent standards of 
what is called Zumutbarkeit in German (that which can be expected of or imposed on 
someone); submit to “lifelong learning” and feel responsible for their own “employabil-
ity”; give up security for “flexicurity,” which means accepting spells of unemployment 
hoped to be short due to effective support by the government employment agency; 
agree to increasing shares of pay being commuted into bonuses dependent on indi-
vidual and collective performance; understand that there can be no family wage any 
more as employers can no longer pay for two when employing just one; and generally 
lead a flexible life attuned to the twists and turns of ever more rapidly changing inter-
national markets, as opposed to a stable life sheltered from the vagaries and volatilities 
of fluctuating relative prices.
Table 1 Employment and social security
Rate of  
economic activity
Covered by  
social insurance
Unemployed
All Women In percent of economically active population
1970 65.8 45.9 ? 0.4
1975 64.3 46.4 74.5 2.3
1980 65.2 48.3 75.1 1.7
1985 61.1 47.0 68.9 6.7
1990 66.3 53.8 70.9 4.5
1995 64.6 55.1 71.4 7.9
2000 65.4 57.7 66.2 7.4
2005 65.4 59.5 60.6 10.6
2006 67.1 61.4 61.1 9.8
2007 68.9 63.1 61.5 8.3
1990 and earlier: West Germany only.
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In Germany, the departure from the standard employment relationship and the Fordist 
institutional and social structure started late and advanced only slowly. Overall rates 
of participation in paid employment continued to decline until the mid-1980s, due 
to a social security system which allowed for high rates of early retirement, and fe-
male participation rates remained low, partially as a result of high wages earned by 
male breadwinners (Table 1). It was not until the end of the century that participation 
rates picked up, among women by eight percentage points between 1995 and 2007, and 
among the population as a whole by more than four percentage points. Especially since 
the Schröder and post-Schröder reforms, a growing number of people have been enter-
ing the labor market, undoubtedly pushed in large part by cuts in unemployment ben-
efits and more restrictive definitions of which types of jobs were considered acceptable 
(Zumutbarkeit). Other contributing factors probably include a decade of declining real 
wages leading to more women taking up employment to supplement the household in-
come. The effect was an increase in so-called atypical employment, which includes both 
part-time employment (Teilzeit) and low-wage employment below the social security 
threshold (geringfügige Beschäftigung; Table 2). During the ten years from 1997 to 2007, 
the share of atypical employment, mostly of women, in total employment grew by no 
less than eight percentage points, from 17.5 to 25.5 percent. As female employment in-
creased, average working time for women decreased faster than for men (Table 3), again 
in particular after 1995, and average hours per employee declined sharply, confirming 
that female employment continues to be in large part atypical or casual employment. 
There are also strong indications that the stability of employment declined significantly 
during the 1990s, especially among workers with low skills, although exact data are hard 
to come by (Erlinghagen 2006). This trend has probably been reinforced by the increase 
in atypical employment in the middle of the present decade. Moreover, the percent-
age of labor market participants covered by social security declined by ten percentage 
points in the twelve years from 1995 to 2007 (Table 1).
The slow but accelerating decomposition of the Fordist standard employment relation-
ship and the growing flexibility of labor markets obviously entailed greater risks and 
higher uncertainty for labor market participants, in particular blue-collar workers. The 
question with which I started was how long a process like this can continue, and what 
sort of stabilizing intervention might be required to make more flexible markets for 
Table 2 Atypical employment, in percent of total employment
Part-timea Marginala Temporarya Total
1997 11.7 4.5 6.3 17.5
1999 13.0 5.9 7.4 19.7
2001 13.9 6.1 7.0 20.1
2003 15.3 6.7 6.8 21.2
2005 16.2 8.4 8.3 23.4
2007 16.4 9.2 8.8 25.5
a Multiple counts possible.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, September 2008: Atypische Beschäftigung auf dem deutschen Arbeits-
markt. Wiesbaden.
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labor both economically viable and socially acceptable. Before I move on to this, how-
ever, I note that the decline in employment stability during the past three decades has 
been accompanied by an apparently even more dramatic decline of traditional family 
structures. In fact, the historical transition to what may well be referred to as more 
flexible families alongside more flexible employment seems to have started earlier than 
the transformation of the employment system, at least in Germany, where the postwar 
labor market regime lasted longer than elsewhere. For example, in parallel with growing 
labor market flexibility the number of marriages per year has declined almost continu-
ously since 1970 while divorce rates have doubled, both relative to the population and 
to existing marriages. Also, the relationship between new marriages and separations 
per year fell from almost six new marriages per divorce to less than two over 35 years 
(Table 4). At the same time, the number of couples living together without being mar-
ried (non-marital unions) increased by no less than a factor of seven between 1978 
and 2005, and the number of non-married couples with children rose twice as fast, by 
a factor of 15, in the same period. Even more remarkably, in 2005 almost 30 percent of 
newborn children were born to unmarried parents, while at the beginning of the 1970s 
this figure had been less than six percent.
The dissolution of the Fordist social order, in other words, extended not just to the in-
stitutions of the labor market but also to the social structure that such institutions had 
supposedly been set up to support. Whatever else the data on marriage, divorce, non-
marital unions and single and non-married parenthood may say, they indicate an emer-
gent pattern of exchange in personal and family life that is much looser and, indeed, 
much more “flexible” than the traditional pattern of the 1950s and 1960s – a move-
ment, as it were, from a petty-bourgeois to a petty-bohémien way of life among broad 
segments of the population. Mutual commitments appear to have become weaker, or 
in any case less binding and obligatory, with an increased possibility and in fact prob-
ability of exit making them inherently less reliable. In other words, with the arrival of 
the post-Fordist family, the same de-institutionalization that is associated with flexible 
labor markets seems to have taken place in people’s personal lives, forcing individuals 
to live with much less economic and, very likely, emotional security than in the more 
settled past. As an indicator of how much the horizon of predictability in private life has 
Table 3 Total hours worked and average working hours, 1970–2005
Total hours worked 
(in billions)
Average yearly  
working hours  
per worker
Average weekly working hours
Men Women
1970 52.3 1,955 45.2 39.2
1975 47.4 1,794 42.2 35.9
1980 48.0 1,750 42.4 35.2
1985 46.1 1,695 41.4 34.4
1990 48.0 1,611 40.7 31.9
1995 57.7 1,534 40.8 33.1
2000 57.7 1,473 40.6 29.8
2005 55.8 1,437 38.1 26.9
1990 and earlier: West Germany only
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shrunk, one may look at birthrates, given that children represent the longest possible 
commitment human beings can make, and the most difficult to renounce. While in 
1965, there were still 17.4 newborn children per 1,000 inhabitants, in 2005 that number 
had steeply declined to 8.3, that is to less than half (Table 6).
How is the coincidence of the spread of uncertain exchanges in labor markets and in 
civil life to be accounted for? Two narratives, contradictory at first glance, can be and 
are being told on the subject, one based on the attractions of markets, the other on 
their pressures and constraints. The first, liberationist, narrative considers and accepts 
increased uncertainty as a price of progress toward greater personal freedom. The exit 
of women from traditional family life into paid employment is regarded as an overdue 
rejection of a repressive pre-modern institution and way of life. Sure enough, women’s 
entry into the labor market, and with it into personal independence (“emancipation”), 
had to be achieved against the resistance of the Fordist labor market regime, which 
was at base a male construct dependent on female domesticity and subservience. Actu-
ally, rigid labor markets and rigid family structures were birds of a feather, just as free 
markets for labor are an essential condition of personal liberty. Especially in countries 
like Germany, where traditional labor market institutions were more resilient than else-
where, it took time for the growing female labor supply to wear down the institutional 
barriers against employment expansion inherent in the family wage system and a social 
security regime based on the model of a single male breadwinner. Even in Germany, 
however, rigid institutions protecting the historical prerogative of males to sell their 
labor power for money, and with it the established family system and its gendered divi-
sion of labor, finally had to give. Today growing labor market flexibility enables women 
to have ever better access to waged employment, increasingly on the same conditions as 
men. Obviously, flexible labor markets that are open to all cannot offer the same sort of 
security and stability as the labor markets of Fordism, nor will they pay one worker to 
feed two people. But this is a price worth paying, and in any case it is up to individuals’ 
inventiveness to protect themselves from the new uncertainties, supported hopefully 
by a reformed social policy designed to fit the needs of a non-gendered workforce and 
society.
Table 4  Marriages and divorces, 1970–2005
New marriages per 
10,000 inhabitants
Divorces Ratio of new  
marriages  
per divorce
Per 10,000  
inhabitants
Per 10,000 existing  
marriages
1970 72.9 12.6 50.9 5.8
1975 62.7 17.3 67.4 3.6
1980 58.8 15.6 61.3 3.8
1985 59.8 21.0 86.1 2.9
1990 65.8 19.4 81.0 3.4
1995 52.6 20.7 86.8 2.5
2000 50.9 23.7 101.3 2.2
2005 47.1 24.5 108.8 1.9
1990 and earlier: West Germany only.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, own calculations.
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Compare this to the market pressure narrative, which goes roughly as follows. Begin-
ning in the 1970s, stagnant real wages and rising unemployment compelled households 
to supply more labor to the market to defend their accustomed standard of living. Erod-
ing social protections against commodification of labor and declining efficacy of social 
rights, caused by intensified competition in product markets and mounting political 
counter-offensives by employers, exposed workers and their families to rising market 
uncertainties. As a result, they found themselves forced to supplement single-earner in-
comes by women taking up employment, part-time where it was available, as a second-
best response to the economic problems caused by accelerating industrial restructuring. 
As an alternative to the emerging one-and-a-half jobs family functioning as an impro-
vised private addition to the public social security system, formation of stable family re-
lations was postponed or abandoned altogether as a lack of economic security impeded 
entry into a settled life. One result was and continues to be a growing number of single 
mothers living near the poverty line. Indeed, having children, especially more than one 
or two, became the single most important cause of poverty, of individuals as well as 
families. Small wonder, then, that the birthrate continued to decline, long after effective 
methods of birth control had first become available on a broad scale in the late 1960s. 
By the end of the century, rising costs of social assistance forced reforms of the welfare 
state and the labor market regime to push the unemployed, including single mothers, 
back into employment. Improving market access for “outsiders,” in turn, required that 
institutional protections of “insiders” were disabled at least in part, intensifying the 
spreading sense of uncertainty about the future. As opportunities for all sorts of “atypi-
cal,” flexible employment proliferated, so did the pressures on the standard employ-
ment relationship at the center of the employment regime. Unlike in the liberationist 
story, that is to say, where market participation clears the way to a desirable social life, in 
the economic pressure scenario markets are imposed rather than sought, with market 
uncertainties undermining the formation of stable social commitments or thwarting 
them in the first place, as the system of social rights invented in the postwar period to 
protect society from commodification gives way under the impact of marketization.
Table 5 Family relations of children, parents and couples
Single parents,  
in 1,000s
Unmarried  
couples with  
children, in 1,000s
Sum of (a) and 
(b) in percent of 
all families with 
children
Non-marital  
births in percent 
of all births
Unmarried  
couples in percent 
of all couples
(a) (b)
1970 ? ? ? 5.5 ?
1975 ? ? ? 6.1 ?
1980 1,465a 51a 13.9a 7.6 2.3a
1985 1,690 70 16.9 9.4 4.7
1990 1,715 107 17.1 10.5 6.3
1995 2,266b 475b 21.0b 16.1 9.2b
2000 2,347 621 23.1 23.4 10.7
2005 2,572 770 26.6 29.2 12.8
a 1978;
b 1996; 1990 and earlier: West Germany only.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, own calculations.
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Of course, there are several ways in which the two stories may be compatible. For ex-
ample, while the liberationist narrative probably applies at the top end of the social 
spectrum, the market pressure account is likely to reflect conditions at the bottom. Ob-
viously, to what extent people are able to live with or even enjoy the uncertainty of 
market exchanges differs by social class. What may be a welcome adventure for one 
– the exodus from the rigid Fordist family into flexible markets – may be an unpleasant 
economic necessity for the other. The better one is placed in the pyramid of stratifica-
tion, the more skills and the more access to family and other connections one is likely 
to have on which to draw in making market opportunities out of market constraints. 
Indeed, in the experience of the middle class, human capital is a perfect substitute for 
social rights – which, incidentally, may be why reformers of the welfare state can expect 
to persuade the public that education can serve as a panacea to any discomfort brought 
by liberalization.
Another way in which the two narratives may be reconciled is if one takes the liberation-
ist account to be an ideological representation of the structural constraints described 
by the market pressure account. While ideologies do reflect reality, they do so selectively 
in ways that make it appear ideal or inevitable, and in this sense provide it with a posi-
tive meaning. Ideologies, like the glorifying representation of the flexible life and of the 
freedom and opportunity that come with it, may become hegemonic if the image they 
project of the real world or its future prospects appears plausible and attractive to those 
who dominate public discourse. By becoming hegemonic, an ideological worldview 
turns into a socially obligatory way of perceiving the world and speaking about as well 
as acting within it. In this way, what may start out as market pressure on households 
struggling to defend their living standards may gradually translate into a social duty to 
seek paid employment and accept the outcomes of market transactions as by and large 
fair reflections of individual effort and ability, in compliance with a general cultural 
expectation that people should greet the inevitable with enthusiasm and respond to 
necessity in good spirit. Roughly along these lines, the requirement of an expanded sup-
ply of labor by households to the market, for both capitalist growth and the continued 
viability of the welfare state, seems to have met with an emergent willingness of people 
Table 6 Births per 1,000 inhabitants, total fertility rate, 1970–2005
Births
per 1,000 inhabitants Total fertility rate
1970 13.4 2.02
1975 10.0 1.45
1980 11.0 1.44
1985 10.5 1.28
1990 11.4 1.45
1995 9.4 1.25
2000 9.3 1.38
2005 8.3 1.34
1990 and earlier: West Germany only.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt.
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not just to live with rising market uncertainty but also to make do with considerably 
less stability and more uncertainty in their civil life as well.
How exactly market expansion and the increasing de-institutionalization of family life 
are connected is far from well understood, in part certainly because of a thicket of ta-
boos and rules of political correctness that impede unbiased inquiry. Firmly held per-
sonal beliefs clash under conditions of high moral uncertainty, in culture wars that have 
far-reaching implications for powerful economic interests and motives. As in particular 
the American example reminds us, it is not just the market, but also the welfare state 
that must be considered in this context, adding to the subject’s economic, political and 
moral complexities. For example, where formal institutionalization of family relations 
carries with it obligations to mutual assistance that replace entitlements to social secu-
rity benefits, modern welfare states may entail economic incentives not to enter into 
formalized family bonds. This holds especially if increasingly flexible labor markets 
offer individuals little certainty that they will always be able to support an unemployed 
spouse or a family with children. If two individuals combined can draw more social 
assistance than one married couple, social policies create sound economic reasons not 
to enter into institutionalized family relations. One remembers that the first cohabiting 
couples in Germany after the war were pensioners, where the woman was unwilling 
to give up her war widow’s pension. Another case in point is the explosive growth of 
the number of Bedarfsgemeinschaften (households) after the enactment of Hartz IV (a 
major reform of unemployment benefits and social assistance in 2005), when young 
people moved out of their parents’ homes in order to be entitled to draw social assis-
tance as individuals, while couples living together moved into different apartments, or 
pretended to have done so. Much more research seems needed on how employment 
patterns, welfare state policies and family relations interact, and I will not and cannot 
go into details here.
In any case, for present purposes it is enough to note that market expansion, in par-
ticular the liberalization of labor markets and the re-commodification of labor, were 
accompanied and facilitated by a broad and astonishingly successful effort at popular 
re-education, a cultural revolution teaching people to regard flexibility and uncertainty 
as individual challenges – as opportunities not just for economic prosperity but also 
for personal growth – rather than as violations of collectively achieved social rights.1 
In the process it appears that living with market uncertainties is much more tolerable 
for human beings, or can be imposed on them with much less coercion, than might 
have been expected only a few decades earlier. Obviously the range of humanly feasible 
ways of life, or lifestyles, is a good deal broader than was believed in the middle of the 
twentieth century, and the limits to marketization can be pushed back much further 
than conservative radicals like Polanyi would have thought. Clearly Polanyi would have 
been surprised about the extent to which people in advanced capitalist societies proved 
1 Of course the battle is far from over, as documented in Germany by the pockets of resistance 
organized by the new left-wing party, Die Linke.
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willing – or accepted being economically and culturally compelled – to adapt to both 
an economic process and a social structure as devoid of stability and as much exposed 
to contingent fluctuation as today’ labor markets. In hindsight, it seems extraordinary 
how functional needs and cultural values developed in parallel, giving rise to an increas-
ingly normatively obligatory pattern of social life in line with the requirements of an 
expanding market economy in general and of increased female labor market participa-
tion in particular: a pattern that includes cultural and structural individualization, hard 
work and conspicuous consumption as signatures of social belonging and individual 
achievement, high regional and occupational mobility, penetration of work deep into 
the private sphere, stringent rationalization of family life to fit the needs of flexible work 
arrangements, a willingness to live with and excel in the management of persistent time 
pressures (Schor 1992), more short-term modes of social integration and personal and 
professional identity formation (Sennett 1998), and generally growing uncertainty and 
unpredictability of personal circumstances, both at work and at home.
Clearly, the newly evolving relationship between markets and social structures is not 
without contradictions. The culture of marketization has its own discontents, like any 
other culture. A minor example is the current conflict between an employment policy of 
“activation,” which includes a requirement for workers to travel long distances between 
their places of residence and of work, and the abolishment of tax benefits for commut-
ers.2 Another, more important case in point is the tension between female labor market 
participation and the political expectation, inevitable for fiscal reasons, that families 
will bear the main share of the growing burden of care for the aged. While this has yet 
to come to the fore as a policy issue, what is already very much visible is the decline in 
the rate of fertility. For a number of years now there has been a growing consensus, even 
among “conservative” parties like the CDU, that flexible family structures and employ-
ment patterns force the state to take responsibility for child rearing if children are what 
government perceives to be in the public interest. This is because both at the bottom 
and at the top of society, families and individuals are becoming too busy pursuing the 
attractions or coping with the uncertainties of markets to take upon themselves the 
additional burden of bringing up enough children to secure the reproduction of the 
society. Here as elsewhere, the ironic twist is that market expansion, in response to both 
the rewards and the pressures of markets, creates costs that fall on public policy to cover. 
At least this applies in a country like Germany, where even middle-class families today 
expect the state to provide for replacement of foregone income and for free childcare, 
so as to make possible, as a public responsibility, the equal participation of men and 
women in the labor market.
In fact, an important development in response to the advancing commodification of 
labor is the appearance on the horizon of an entirely new kind of social policy, one that 
2 Where both partners of a couple, married or not, are in paid employment, as is socially expected, 
and have to travel to work in different directions, changing the place of residence is not an op-
tion.
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seems surprisingly acceptable across the political spectrum although it penetrates deep-
ly into the social fabric. With growing economic uncertainty, due to the demise of the 
family wage and the arrival of flexible employment relations as well as family structures, 
and in the face of rising economic opportunity costs of having children, there seems 
to be broad agreement that government intervention is required to compensate for the 
decline in economic and social stability and its negative effect on fertility that come 
with market expansion. State provision of free childcare, higher child allowances, a new 
family allowance for parents of newborn children, increased child supplements to so-
cial assistance and other benefits are currently about to transform child raising from a 
private to a public responsibility, well into the middle classes.3 The underlying consen-
sus seems to be that if the state wants children although families can or will no longer 
produce them, the production of children is for the state to provide for. Remarkably, 
what is called family policy is the only area of public policy whose budget has grown in 
recent years and is scheduled to grow further. Moreover, it seems to be largely exempt 
from distributive conflict in that costly income replacement programs for middle-class 
parents holding two jobs, with considerable upward redistribution effects, are appar-
ently beyond political contention – not just in the centrist, Continental welfare state of 
Germany but also in a deeply social-democratic country like Sweden.
In conclusion, it would appear that in both accounts of the co-evolution of flexible la-
bor markets and of de-institutionalized patterns of family life – the market opportuni-
ties as well as the market pressures account – marketization causes gaps in social struc-
tures and gives rise to collective dysfunctions that must be repaired at public expense. 
Here as elsewhere, while private profit requires subsidization by a public infrastructure, 
the private problems caused by its pursuit need to be fixed by social policy. The logic 
seems remarkably similar to that of the current banking crisis, where the liberation of 
financial markets from traditional constraints and the progressive commodification of 
money have ultimately issued in irresistible pressures on the state to step in and restore 
with its specific means the social commons of stable expectations and mutual confi-
dence. In both cases, and perhaps generally, capitalism seems to imply a need for a pub-
lic power capable of creating substitutes for social relations invaded by market relations 
and as a consequence becoming unable to perform some of their previous functions. 
There is of course no guarantee that such work of social reconstruction can always be 
done. Even where something is considered “functionally necessary” by social theorists 
or social agents, this does not mean that the political will and the economic resources 
can in fact be mobilized to procure it. In the case of family policy filling the gap caused 
by the destruction of traditional family relations due to the attractions and pressures 
of markets, the problem is for an already overburdened and indeed highly indebted 
welfare state to divert the necessary funds from other commitments. Whether this will 
in fact be possible is an entirely open question that I cannot address here.
3 In countries like Iceland and Sweden, this is already by and large reality. In the United States, the 
hectic life of middle-class single parents and two-earner families is made possible by low-wage 
service workers, mostly immigrants, and a general commercialization of family life, as a func-
tional alternative to public support in Europe (Hochschild 2003).
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